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Pathways to Accountability for
Starvation Crimes in Yemen
Laura Graham *
Abstract
This Note argues that perpetrators who use starvation as a method
of warfare in Yemen’s Civil War should be held accountable. Two
primary pathways to accountability are advanced. First, this Note
argues that the U.N. Security Council should authorize an ad-hoc
tribunal with a mandate to prosecute individuals responsible for
starvation crimes in Yemen. Second, this Note argues that the
international community should refer violations of international
humanitarian law to the International Court of Justice to bring
accountability to State actors that have used starvation as a method of
warfare in Yemen. Part I examines the crisis in Yemen, including an
exploration of the pre-famine conditions prior to the war in 2015, and
the worst periods of food-insecurity throughout the past four years.
Part II addresses the legal concept of starvation and analyzes the
elements of the crime, requisite mens rea, evidentiary standard, and
modes of liability for perpetrators. Part III presents the evidence of
destruction of objects indispensable to survival and intentional
starvation of civilians in Sana’a, Ta’izz, Tihama governate, the Red Sea
Coast fishing villages, and the port of Hudaydah. Part IV presents a
legal analysis of the crimes committed in Yemen and lays out the
options for accountability mechanisms. Finally, the conclusion
advocates for garnering political support among members of the U.N.
Security Council to authorize an ad-hoc tribunal with a mandate to
prosecute perpetrators of starvation crimes in Yemen, as well as an
additional pathway at the International Court of Justice to bring
accountability to State actors for violations of international
humanitarian law.

*

J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, May
2021.
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Introduction
Starvation has been used as a method of warfare for millennia. 1
Until the Geneva Conventions were widely adopted in 1949, siege
warfare—resulting in starvation of civilian populations—was considered
a legitimate military tactic. 2 Even today, sieges and blockades are not
violations of the Geneva Conventions per se, but the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions stipulate the rules that parties to
an armed conflict must follow with respect to sieges, blockades, and
prohibitions on destruction of objects indispensable to survival and
1.

During the Peloponnesian War, for example, more than 100 sieges were
attempted by from 431 to 404 BC. See BRIAN CAMPBELL, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF WARFARE IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD, 644 (2018).
Alexander the Great was notorious for cutting off the enemy’s access to
water sources in order to hasten defeat. See Esbjörn Rosenblad, Starvation
as a Method of Warfare — Conditions for Regulation by Convention, 7
INT’L L. 255, 252–270 (1973).

2.

David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
245, 265 (2003) (noting the perspective that mass hunger caused by siege
warfare was justified because the military advantage outweighed collateral
damage to civilians).
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starving civilians. 3 Perhaps the most notable change in recent history
is the view that the use of starvation to achieve a military objective is
morally repugnant and perpetrators of starvation crimes should be
stopped from deploying this barbaric practice to harm civilian
populations. 4 And yet, the crime of starvation as defined in the Rome
Statute, 5 has never been prosecuted.
This Note examines the pathways to accountability for starvation
of civilians. Specifically, this Note analyzes how individuals can be
prosecuted for the starvation of civilians in Yemen, how States can be
held accountable for breaches of international obligations, and which
courts or tribunals have jurisdiction over these violations. This Note
advocates two primary pathways to accountability. First, it argues that
the U.N. Security Council should—in compliance with S.C. Resolution
2417, which condemns the use of starvation as a method of warfare in
Yemen 6—authorize an ad-hoc tribunal with a mandate to prosecute
individuals responsible for starvation crimes in Yemen’s Civil War.
Second, it argues that the international community should refer
violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) to bring accountability to State actors that have
used starvation as a method of warfare in Yemen.
The war in Yemen provides a unique case study for determining
how perpetrators and State actors could be held to account for
starvation as a method of warfare. Part I examines the crisis in Yemen,
including an exploration of the pre-famine conditions prior to the war
in 2015, and the worst periods of food-insecurity throughout the past
four years. Part II addresses the legal concept of starvation and
analyzes the elements of the crime, requisite mens rea, evidentiary
standard, and modes of liability for perpetrators. Part III presents the
evidence of destruction of objects indispensable to survival and
3.

Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Sieges, the Law and Protecting Civilians,
CHATHAM HOUSE: ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFFS., 3–4 (June 2019),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research
/2019-06-27-Sieges-Protecting-Civilians_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RJXSWUH].

4.

See generally S.C. Res. 2417 (May 24, 2018); See comments made by Lise
Gregoire Van Haaren of The Netherlands supporting adoption of S.C. Res.
2417: “For the first time, this Council unequivocally condemns starvation
as a method of warfare.” Press Release, Security Council, Adopting
Resolution 2417 (2018), Security Council Strongly Condemns Starving of
Civilians, Unlawfully Denying Humanitarian Access as Warfare Tactics,
U.N. Press Release SC/13354 (May 24, 2018).

5.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 9 (“Intentionally using starvation as a method of
warfare by depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival,
including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the
Geneva Conventions.”) [hereinafter Rome Statute].

6.

S.C. Res. 2417 (May 24, 2018).
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intentional starvation of civilians in Sana’a, Ta’izz, Tihama governate,
the Red Sea Coast fishing villages, and the port of Hudaydah. It reviews
evidence showing that the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition and Iraniansupported Houthi rebels are the primary belligerents of starvation. Part
IV presents a legal analysis of the violations committed in Yemen and
reviews the options for accountability mechanisms. It describes the
challenges to prosecuting starvation crimes in Yemen, which include
evidentiary limitations, lack of political will, and the power dynamics
on the U.N. Security Council. This Note concludes, optimistically, that
despite these challenges, starvation crimes in Yemen can and should be
prosecuted to bring accountability and justice for the victims. Finally,
the conclusion advances the case for garnering political support among
members of the U.N. Security Council to authorize an ad-hoc tribunal
with a mandate to prosecute perpetrators of starvation crimes in
Yemen, as well as an additional track for violations of international
humanitarian law at the ICJ to bring accountability to State actors for
breaches of international obligations during armed conflicts.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The war in Yemen has created the world’s worst humanitarian
crisis. 7 Due to the ongoing civil war that began in 2015 between Houthi
rebels and the Yemeni government, widespread hunger and disease have
left tens of thousands of civilians dead. 8 More than 20 million people
are suffering from food insecurity and preventable diseases such as

7.

U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Pledging
Conference on Yemen, (Apr. 1, 2018),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-04-03/secretarygenerals-remarks-pledging-conference-yemen-delivered
[https://perma.cc/U3X4-DFZ7]; see also U.N. Secretary-General,
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief
Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien: Statement to the Security Council on
Missions to Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya and an Update
on the Oslo Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, United
Nations Security Council (Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter O’Brien Statement
2017] https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/statement-andspeech/ERC_USG%20Stephen%20OBrien%20Statement%20to%20the%
20SecCo%20on%20Missions%20to%20Yemen%20South%20Sudan%20So
malia%20and%20Kenya%20and%20update%20on%20Oslo%20Conferenc
e%20-%2010%2003%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y72-7NJ8]
(statement of Stephen O’Brien) (“We stand at a critical point in
history. Already at the beginning of the year we are facing the largest
humanitarian crisis since the creation of the United Nations.”).

8.

See Zachary Laub & Kali Robinson, Yemen in Crisis, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (July 29, 2020),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis
[https://perma.cc/SA8Q-C3NW].
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cholera and severe malnutrition. 9 Since 2017, an estimated 13 million
Yemenis have been declared at risk of starvation, 10 and at least 85,000
children have died from starvation and starvation-related diseases.11
Nearly 100,000 deaths from conflict-related causes have been reported
since 2015. 12 Yemen has been teetering on the brink of famine since
before the war broke out in 2015. 13
As the poorest nation in the Arab region, approximately 44% of
Yemenis were undernourished in 2012, 14 with as many as five million
people relying on emergency food aid. 15 Water scarcity was such a
significant problem for this arid country that in 2012, experts predicted
that the country’s water would run out by 2017. 16 In early 2017, the
9.

Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian crisis in Yemen remains the worst in
the
world,
warns
UN,
UN
NEWS
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032811
[https://perma.cc/T6GH-79WV]. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF) has treated 143,467 cholera and 23,319
malnutrition cases between March 2015 and September 2019. See Yemen:
Crisis Update November 2019, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 19,
2019),
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/newsstories/story/yemen-crisis-update-november-2019
[https://perma.cc/S6FE-JYAG].

10.

Yemen Could be ‘Worst Famine in 100 Years,’ BBC NEWS (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east45857729/yemen-could-be-worst-famine-in-100-years
[https://perma.cc/4HP9-SJZC].

11.

Bethan McKernan, Yemen: Up to 85,000 Young Children Dead from
Starvation, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/21/yemen-youngchildren-dead-starvation-disease-save-the-children
[https://perma.cc/TF5X-FMVN].

12.

Press Release: Yemen War Death Toll Exceeds 90,000 According to New
(June
18,
2019),
ACLED
Data
for
2015,
ACLED,
https://www.acleddata.com/2019/06/18/press-release-yemen-war-deathtoll-exceeds-90000-according-to-new-acled-data-for-2015/
[https://perma.cc/SD8T-G756].

13.

See Peter Salisbury, Yemen’s Looming Famine has Been a Long Time
Coming, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/12/05/yemens-looming-famine-has-been-a-long-timecoming/ [https://perma.cc/L58Y-86YL].

14.

Joseph Hincks, What You Need to Know About the Crisis in Yemen,
TIME (Nov. 3, 2016, 2:46 AM), https://time.com/4552712/yemen-warhumanitarian-crisis-famine/ [https://perma.cc/6V26-FM7J].

15.

Id.

16.

See Frederika Whitehead, Water Scarcity in Yemen: The Country’s
Forgotten Conflict, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:18 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2015/apr/02/water-scarcity-yemen-conflict
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U.N. declared Yemen in danger of imminent famine. 17 A famine is “a
crisis of mass hunger that causes elevated mortality over a specific
period of time.” 18 Famines have multiple causes that include “both
structural factors that determine vulnerability and the proximate
triggers of the crisis.” 19 Famines can be distinguished between
magnitude (the number of casualties) and severity (the level of food
insecurity). 20 The severity of food insecurity consists of five phases: (1)
minimal; (2) stressed; (3) crisis; (4) emergency; and (5) famine. 21 In a
phase 5 famine, “households have an extreme lack of food and/or other
basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies . . .
starvation, death, destitution, and extremely critical acute malnutrition
levels are evident.” 22 Multiple regions in Yemen are presently described
as being in phase 3 crisis or phase 4 emergency, as indicated on the
map below. 23 The worst areas of food insecurity are where the conflict
is being fought—Hudaydah, Sana’a, Ta’izz, Aden, and the Red Sea
Coast villages. 24

[https://perma.cc/53BC-MFRQ]; Time Running Out for Solution to
Yemen’s Water crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2012, 7:30 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2012/aug/27/solution-yemen-water-crisis
[https://perma.cc/G8HS-7W29].
17.

O’Brien Statement 2017, supra note 7.

18.

Alex De Waal, The End of Famine? Prospects for the Elimination of
Mass Starvation by Political Action, 62 POL. GEOGRAPHY 184, 185
(2018).

19.

Id.

20.

Paul Howe & Stephen Deveraux, Famine Intensity and Magnitude Scales:
A proposal for an instrumental definition of famine, 28 DISASTERS 353,
353 (2004).

21.

Integrated Phase Classification, FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYS.
NETWORK, https://fews.net/IPC [https://perma.cc/BS2Z-3KUJ].

22.

Id.

23.

Large-scale Assistance Needs and Risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) Likely
to Persist as War Nears Five Years, FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYS.
NETWORK, https://fews.net/east-africa/yemen/food-securityoutlook/october-2019 [https://perma.cc/VSL7-DVL4].

24.

Id.
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FEBRUARY – MAY 2020 25

.

Civilian deaths in Yemen caused by starvation and starvationrelated diseases such as cholera are man-made. 26 Three categories of
events are primarily responsible for starvation deaths and injury: (1)
economic crisis caused by the dismantling of the Yemen Banking
System; 27 (2) military attacks on agricultural and food production that
25.

Id.

26.

See generally ALEX DE WAAL, MASS STARVATION: THE HISTORY
FUTURE OF FAMINE (2018).

27.

De Waal, supra note 18, at 194 (“The economic embargo enforced by
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, supported by American and
British warships, along with the destruction of infrastructure including
markets, roads and ports by bombing and the central bank’s non-payment
of salaries in Houthi-controlled areas, is the reason why Yemen stands at
the brink of famine. But the principal measures taken, which amount to
economic warfare, were approved by the UN Security Council.”).
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destroy, deny or render useless objects indispensable to survival; 28 and
(3) blockades of airports and seaports causing obstruction of
humanitarian aid. 29 This Note will focus on military attacks on
agricultural and food production and blockades at Ta’izz, Tihama, the
Red Sea Coast, and the port of Hudaydah. 30
The groups responsible for these atrocities include all of the major
parties to the conflict: Iranian-supported Houthi rebels, Yemeni
government and military, as well as the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition, and
the States that support these armed forces—Iran, Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan,
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia.31
Documentation of attacks on civilian food supplies by multiple media
outlets shows that perpetrators targeted civilians as part of a method
of warfare. 32 In particular, some reports point to Saudi Arabia’s Crown
Prince Mohammad bin Salman having authorized the use of starvation
as a method of warfare to defeat the Houthis. 33

II. LAW AND RULES OF ARMED CONFLICTS
The laws of war and conduct of parties to an armed conflict are
governed by international humanitarian law (IHL). 34 These rules, which
create minimum standards for conduct in armed conflicts, 35 are
enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, drafted at the end of World
War II and designed to establish international norms for the treatment
28.

MARTHA MUNDY, THE STRATEGIES OF THE COALITION IN
WAR: AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND FOOD WAR 13 (2018).

29.

Yemen: Coalition Blockade Imperils Civilians: UN Should Sanction
Senior Saudi Leaders, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/yemen-coalition-blockadeimperils-civilians [https://perma.cc/VV89-3NMG].

30.

MUNDY, supra note 28, at 2, 5–6.

31.

Zachary Laub & Kali Robinson, Yemen in Crisis, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis
[https://perma.cc/Y6P7-RP3J] (last updated July 29, 2020).

THE

YEMEN

32.

See MUNDY, supra note 28.

33.

A senior Saudi Arabia-led Coalition Arabia-led Coalition diplomat
stated off-record, “[o]nce we control them, we will feed them.” MUNDY,
supra note 28, at 7; see also Bin Salman Threatens to Target Women
and Children in Yemen Despite International Criticism, MIDDLE EAST
MONITOR (Aug. 27, 2018, 10:39 AM),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180827-bin-salman-threatens-totarget-women-and-children-in-yemen-despite-international-criticism/
[https://perma.cc/9YUY-LPFK] [hereinafter Bin Salman Threatens].

34.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 95, 105 (July
9) [hereinafter Wall AO].

35.

Marcus, supra note 2, at 270.
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of civilians, combatants, prisoners of war, and wounded or sick during
armed conflicts. 36 Ratified by all states, 37 the Geneva Conventions are
universally binding and are considered customary international law. 38
Under IHL, starvation is defined as a forbidden method of warfare
consisting of deliberately depriving civilians of food. 39 For example, it
is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation
works, etc., for the specific purpose of denying them their sustenance
value to the civilian population or to the adverse party, in order to
starve civilians, cause them to move away, or for any other motive. 40
Derogations of this prohibition may only be made by a party to the
armed conflict within such territory under its own control where
required by imperative military necessity. 41 According to David Marcus,
violations of the prohibitions against starvation are famine crimes,
which may be classified as first-degree or second-degree. 42 First-degree
famine crimes occur when “an individual . . . knowingly creat[ed],
inflict[ed], or prolong[ed] conditions that result in or contribute to the
starvation of a significant number of people.” 43 Second-degree famine
crimes occur when “an individual . . . recklessly ignor[es] evidence that
the policies for which he or she bears responsibility for creating,
inflicting, or prolonging are leading to the starvation of a significant
number of people.” 44 Accordingly, an individual who commits a first or
second-degree famine crime may be charged with war crimes or crimes
against humanity. 45

36.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additionalprotocols [https://perma.cc/K3P4-LH6Q].

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

How Does Law Protect in War?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/starvation [https://perma.cc/68RJH8MS].

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Marcus, supra note 2, at 262.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 271.
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War crimes occur during armed conflict against either civilians or
combatants (or both). 46 Isolated attacks are sufficient to amount to a
war crime. 47 In other words, unlike crimes against humanity, there is
no requirement that the attack be widespread or systematic to
constitute a war crime. 48 To charge a perpetrator with a war crime, the
chapeau elements must be satisfied—i.e. that the conduct took place in
the context of and was associated with an armed conflict, and the
perpetrator was aware of the existence of an armed conflict. 49
Intentional starvation of civilians is a violation of customary
international law, IHL under the Geneva Conventions, and
international criminal law (ICL) under the Rome Statute. 50
Crimes against humanity (CAH) may occur during armed conflicts
of an international or non-international character, but CAH can only
occur against civilians. 51 CAH must be committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population. 52 An attack
is widespread if the attack is largescale in nature or number of victims.53
An attack is systematic if it is part of an organized plan or policy such
that there is an improbability of their random occurrence. 54 The
requirement that an attack be widespread or systemic comes from
decisions at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). 55 The
ICTR held that an attack is widespread if it is a “massive, frequent,
46.

War Crimes, U.N. OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION & RESP. TO
PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml
[https://perma.cc/5EK3-MYDL].

47.

MATRIX
NETWORK,
Crimes
Against
Humanity,
CASE
https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/elementsdigest/art-7/common-elements/1/ [https://perma.cc/Y7VE-KSY2].

48.

Id.

49.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).

50.

GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, THE CRIME OF STARVATION AND
OF PROSECUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2019).

51.

Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 47.

METHODS

52.

Id.

53.

Marcus, supra note 2, at 272.

54.

Id.

55.

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 437
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007) (“[T]he
attack must be widespread or systematic, the requirement being
disjunctive rather than cumulative,”); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No.
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 123 (May 21, 1999) (“The attack must contain
one of the alternative conditions of being widespread or systematic.); see
also U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at ¶ 78, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995)
(“elements that should be reflected in the definition of crimes against
humanity included . . . [that] the crimes usually involved a widespread or
systematic attack.”).
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large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness
and directed against a multiplicity of victims.” 56 An attack is systematic
if it “constitutes organized action, following a regular pattern, on the
basis of a common policy and involves substantial public or private
resources. . . . [T]here must exist some preconceived plan or policy.”57
The ICTY listed four elements of a systematic plan:
1. The existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which
the attack is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the
word, that is, to destroy, persecute or weaken a community;
2. The perpetration of a criminal act on a very large scale against
a group of civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of
inhumane acts linked to one another;
3. The preparation and use of significant public or private
resources, whether military or other;
4. The implication of high-level political and/or military
authorities in the definition and establishment of the methodical
plan. 58

The plan of a systematic attack need not be articulated formally,
so long as it can be inferred from the circumstances. 59 Accordingly,
second-degree famine crimes would constitute CAH because they are
widespread by nature. 60
Determining whether to charge perpetrators of starvation for
committing war crimes or CAH depends on the following factors: (1)
whether the targets of the attacks were civilians or combatants; (2)
whether the starvation occurred during an international armed conflict
(IAC) or a non-international armed conflict (NIAC); and (3) whether
56.

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Jan.
27, 2000), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/casedocuments/ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UHL-4SUD].

57.

Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 204 (Jan.
27, 2000), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/casedocuments/ictr-96-13/trial-judgements/en/000127.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YVS-GPMN].

58.

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, ¶¶ 201–203 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28SB-ATVB] (“[a] crime against humanity is made
special by the methods employed in its perpetration (the widespread
character) or by the context in which these methods must be framed (the
systematic character) as well as by the status of the victims (any civilian
population).”).

59.

Id. ¶ 204.

60.

Marcus, supra note 2, at 273.
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the starvation was an isolated event or widespread or systematic.61
While Yemen has characteristics of an IAC insofar as the belligerents
to the conflict include the Yemeni government, Yemeni Republican
Guard, Iran-backed Houthi rebels, and the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition,
it is largely viewed as a civil war of a non-international character, or
NIAC. 62
Starvation is a war crime only where belligerents employ tactics
intended to bring about starvation of a civilian population as part of a
military strategy. 63 Starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited
under international humanitarian and criminal law. 64 Thus,
prosecutions against perpetrators of starvation and breaches of a State’s
international obligations may be brought for destruction of objects
indispensable to survival under Additional Protocols I 65 and II 66 of the
Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute Articles 8(2)(b)(xxv)
intentional use of starvation as a method of warfare, 7(1)(b)
extermination, and 7(1)(k) other inhumane acts. 67 Under Rome Statute
Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), starvation may be charged as a war crime if it
61.

See War Crimes, supra note 46; Crimes Against Humanity, supra note
47. Junteng Zheng, Unlawful Blockades as Crimes Against Humanity, 22
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (2018).

62.

For further discussion of the two types of armed conflicts, see
International Committee on the Red Cross, How is the term “armed
conflict” defined in international law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinionpaper-armed-conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6UQ-8HB6].

63.

GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 8.

64.

Id. at 1.

65.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) art. 54(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter,
Additional Protocol I].

66.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict
(Protocol II) art. 14, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol II]. Prior to the adoption of the 1977 Additional
Protocols, starvation as a necessary military objective was permitted
under international law. See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBER, GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED
STATES
IN
THE
FIELD
arts.
17–18
(1893),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp#sec1
[perma.cc/RTM3-X9PF] (“War is not carried on by arms alone. It is
lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it
leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy. When a commander of a
besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number
of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an
extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the
surrender.”).

67.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, at arts. 8(2)(b)(xxv), 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(k).
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occurs during an IAC, 68 or under a newly adopted amendment to Article
8(2)(e) if the crime occurs during a NIAC. 69 Under Rome Statute
Articles 7(1)(b) extermination, and 7(1)(k) other inhumane acts,
perpetrators of starvation may be charged with CAH, regardless of
whether the acts took place during an IAC or NIAC. 70 Thus, in 2018,
the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2417 to condemn the use
of starvation as a method of warfare and called on member states to
comply with their obligations under IHL to prevent starvation of
civilians during war. 71
A.

International Humanitarian Law

The laws of war dictate that parties to an armed conflict must
abide by certain principles, including: (1) distinction, 72 (2)

68.

In 2018, Switzerland proposed an amendment to the Rome Statute to
include starvation as a war crime capable of being committed in a NIAC.
It was unanimously adopted in December 2019, which means that the
amendment now allows prosecutors to charge perpetrators of starvation
in Yemen with war crimes, though only for future crimes of starvation,
since the amendment would not apply ex post facto. See GLOB. RTS.
COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 3; see also Int’l Crim. Ct., Assembly of
States Parties, Report of the Working Group on Amendments,
Seventeenth Session, Annex IV ¶ 11, ICC-ASP/17/35 (Sept. 20, 2018);
Int’l Crim. Ct., Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Working Group
on Amendments, Eighteenth Session, 7–9, ICC-ASP/18/32 (Dec. 3, 2019),
[hereinafter Assembly of State Parties].

69.

Assembly of State Parties, supra note 68, at 12. However, it is important
to note that amendments can only be applied prospectively and not to
acts that predate an amendment.

70.

Manuel J. Ventura, Prosecuting Starvation Under International Criminal
Law, 17 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781, 792, 796–797, 813 (2019).

71.

S.C. Res. 2417, ¶¶ 5–7 (May 24, 2018).

72.

Distinction requires that parties to an armed conflict distinguish between
civilians and combatants. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art.
57(1)-(2); Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 13(1)–(2); see also
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons AO]
(declaring the principle of distinction is one of the cardinal principles
contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law).
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proportionality 73 and precaution of attacks, 74 (3) military necessity,75
(4) prohibition on unnecessary suffering/superfluous injury, 76 and (5)
humanity (Martens clause). 77 Attacks 78 may only be directed at
combatants. 79 Sieges and blockades, for example, must seek to minimize
civilian harm and be necessary to achieve a legitimate military
objective, such as cutting off supplies to enemy combatants. 80 The
principle of distinction applies in both IACs and NIACs. 81 In order to

73.

An attack is proportional if the incidental loss of civilian life is not
excessive in proportion with the anticipated military advantage
anticipated. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at arts. 51(5)(b),
85(3)(b); Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 26(b), 3(3)(c);
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II, as
amended on 3 May 1996) art. 3(8)(c), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.

74.

Sometimes referred to as the feasibility principle, precaution of attacks
requires that parties to an armed conflict take care to not cause or
minimize civilian harm. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art.
57(1) (“In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken
to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”);
Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 13(1) (“The civilian
population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against
the dangers arising from military operations.”).

75.

Military necessity allows parties to an armed conflict to undertake an
attack when it is necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.
It must be balanced with the principles of distinction and proportionality
to minimize civilian harm. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at
art. 51(4); Wall AO, supra note 34, at ¶ 140.

76.

Parties to an armed conflict are strictly prohibited from using weapons or
means of warfare that would cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous
injury. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 35(2); Rome
Statute, supra note 5, at art. 8(2)(b)(xx); Nuclear Weapons AO, supra
note 72, at ¶ 78.

77.

The principle of humanity, sometimes referred to as the Martens clause,
protects civilians from violations of IHL not expressly covered by
treaties. It was introduced by Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens in the
preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention. See Fundamental Principles of
IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl
[perma.cc/AV48-3GNN].

78.

A siege is a form of attack. See Gillard, supra note 3, at 8.

79.

Customary IHL Rule 1, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1
[perma.cc/8G7L-P2PU].

80.

Gillard, supra note 3, at 2-4.

81.

Id at 3.
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protect civilians during armed conflict, parties to an armed conflict are
obligated to take precaution in their attacks. 82
The principle of military necessity under IHL allows parties to an
armed conflict to use force only to the extent necessary to achieve a
legitimate military objective. 83 Destruction of life and property is
prohibited unless “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”84
The use of force must also be proportional to the expected military
advantage. 85 IHL prohibits attacks which “may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 86 The ICJ
determined in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that States do
not have unlimited freedom of choice in methods of warfare and that
any weapons used may not cause disproportionate injury or unnecessary
suffering, which was defined as “a harm greater than that unavoidable
to achieve legitimate military objectives.” 87 With respect to sieges and
blockades, which can cause starvation, highly qualified publicists have
opined that such methods of warfare would violate the ICJ’s
determination that “methods and means of warfare which would
preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which
would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited.” 88
States that authorize their military forces or provide material support
to non-State actors to commit violations of IHL may be held
accountable for breaches of international obligations under the law of
State responsibility or for violations of relevant treaties. 89
82.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 57(1) (“In the conduct of
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects.”); Additional Protocol II, supra
note 66, at art. 13(1) (“The civilian population and individual civilians
shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations.”).

83.

Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(g),
Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 539; see also Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art.
8(2)(b)(iv); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Protection of Civilian Persons].

84.

Protection of Civilian Persons, supra note 83, at art. 23(g).

85.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 176, 194 (June 27) [hereinafter
Paramilitary Activities]; see also Nuclear Weapons AO, supra note 72, at
¶¶ 30, 41.

86.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 51(5)(b); see also Rome
Statute, supra note 5, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).

87.

Nuclear Weapons AO, supra note 72, at ¶ 78.

88.

Id. ¶ 95.

89.

See, e.g., Paramilitary Activities, supra note 85 at ¶ 228.
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B.

Prohibitions on Starvation as a Method of Warfare under
International Humanitarian Law

Starvation is prohibited as a method of warfare under Additional
Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions. 90 Starvation of civilians
as a method of warfare is prohibited under Article 54 of Additional
Protocol I (API) of the Geneva Conventions:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and
supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying
them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to
the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other
motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the
objects covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action,
provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these
objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian
population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its
starvation or force its movement. 91

This Article requires that the starvation be deliberate: “[t]o use it
as a method of warfare would be to provoke it deliberately, causing the
population to suffer hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources
of food or of supplies.” 92 Methods of warfare refers to the way that
90.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 54; Additional Protocol II,
supra note 66, at art. 14.

91.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 54(1).

92.

Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, art.
54(2) (1987). But see Gillard, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing “a more
complex question is whether the prohibition is limited to situations where
a belligerent deliberately starves civilians, or whether it also covers
situations where, although not intended, the starvation of civilians is the
foreseeable consequence of a particular course of action.”). Cf. U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 5.20.2
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weapons are used in war. 93 More specifically, methods of warfare refers
to “(i) the way and manner in which the weapons are used; (ii) any
specific, tactical or strategic, ways of conducting hostilities that are not
particularly related to weapons and that are intended to overwhelm
and weaken the adversary.” 94 While starvation of civilians is strictly
prohibited under this Article, it is important to note that paragraph 3
creates a lawful exception to the prohibitions on starvation—that is, it
is lawful to starve the enemy in a siege or blockade, so long as the
attack complies with the principles of military necessity, distinction,
and proportionality, and the attack does not deprive civilians of
adequate food or water, or force civilians to leave due to inadequate
food or water. These provisions apply to IACs, and thus, violations of
any of the provisions of Article 54 would amount to either a war crime
or CAH under IHL. 95
Article 70 of Additional Protocol I requires the uninhibited flow of
relief items such as humanitarian aid during armed conflicts:
1.If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a
Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not
adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69,
relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character
and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be
undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in
such relief actions. Offers of such relief shall not be regarded as
interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the
distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those
persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and
nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this
Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special
protection.
2.The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party
shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief
consignments, equipment, and personnel provided in accordance

(2016) (“Military action intended to starve enemy forces, however, must
not be taken where it is expected to result in incidental harm to the
civilian population that is excessive in relation to the military advantage
anticipated to be gained.”).
93.

Id. at art. 35, 51.

94.

N. MELZER & G. GAGGLIOLI, Methods of Warfare, in OXFORD GUIDE
TO INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. (D. Akande and B. Saul, eds. 2019) (citing
to ICRC Commentary, art. 14).

95.

Customary IHL Rule 54, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54 (last visited
Sept. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/A7WF-K7FR].
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with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the
civilian population of the adverse Party. 96

Even though sieges and blockades are allowed during armed
conflicts under IHL, 97 this provision preserves the right of passage of
humanitarian aid to ensure relief to civilians. 98
Article 14 of the Additional Protocol II (APII) of the Geneva
Conventions prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of combat
during NIACs:
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is
therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless,
for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water
installations and supplies and irrigation works. 99

Article 14 is intended as a simplification of Article 54 of API, the
purpose of which is to prohibit deliberately subjecting people to famine
and to preserve the means of subsistence of the civilian population.100
It is a codification of customary international law prohibitions on
starvation, from which no derogation is allowed. 101 Moreover, the
exceptions allowed under Article 54(3)(a)–(b) do not exist in Article 14
of APII. 102 In other words, it is lawful for parties to an armed conflict
to use sieges or blockades to gain a military advantage against
combatants during IACs, but not during NIACs. 103 Finally, while sieges
and blockades are considered legitimate methods of warfare, they must
be directed at combatants, 104 and the besieging party must allow the
free passage of essential supplies and foodstuffs or allow civilian

96.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 70(1)–(2).

97.

GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 21.

98.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 70(2).

99.

Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 14.

100. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 14
(1987).
101. Id.
102. Compare Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 54(3)(a)–(b) with
Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 14.
103. Martin D. Fink, Naval Blockade and the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,
64 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 291, 296 (2017).
104. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note, 100.
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inhabitants of the besieged area to leave. 105 APII applies to NIACs,106
and thus, violations of any of the provisions of Article 14 would amount
to either a war crime or CAH under IHL.
C.

The Crime of Starvation under International Criminal Law
1.

War Crimes

The Rome Statute—adopted in 1998 and entered into force on 1
July 2002—established the International Criminal Court (ICC). 107 It
created four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of aggression. 108 The treaty has been ratified
by 123 State Parties, and its jurisdiction extends only to crimes
committed by or in States that are party to the treaty. 109
Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute criminalizes
“[i]ntentionally using starvation as a method of warfare by depriving
civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully
impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva
Conventions.” 110 There are four elements required to establish the
offence of starvation in an IAC:
1. The perpetrator deprived civilians of objects indispensable to
their survival.
2. The perpetrator intended to starve civilians as a method of
warfare.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated
with an international armed conflict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict. 111

105. Customary IHL Rule 53, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule53
[https://perma.cc/GZ85-4ZSY]; Customary IHL Rule 55, INT’L COMM. OF
THE
RED
CROSS
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule55 [https://perma.cc/T6T2-C7P4]; see also
S.C. Res. 2417, ¶¶ 6, 10 (May 24, 2018) (“wilfully impeding relief supply
and access for responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations
of armed conflict . . . may constitute a violation of international
humanitarian law;”).
106. Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 1.
107. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at frontmatter.
108. Id. at art. 5.
109. Id. at art. 12.
110. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
111. INT’L CRIM. CT., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 31 (2001), at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)
[hereinafter ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].
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Additionally, as of December 2019, Article 8(2)(e) has been
amended to include the following language, “[i]ntentionally using
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of
objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding
relief supplies.” 112 Under the 2019 amendment to Article 8(2)(e), the
elements of the crime of starvation in a NIAC are:
1. The perpetrator deprived civilians of objects indispensable to
their survival.
2. The perpetrator intended to starve civilians as a method of
warfare.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated
with an armed conflict not of an international character
(emphasis added).
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict. 113

Looking at the Articles together, the first element concerns the
actus reus or conduct taken by the perpetrator. It is established by
showing that the perpetrator deprived civilians of objects indispensable
to survival and not by a showing of the result of starvation—i.e., that
civilians died. 114 Thus, the prosecutor must show that the perpetrator
attacked a civilian object such as a water source or food supply. The
second element establishes the mens rea concerning the act of
starvation. Elements one and two operate together, such that
unintentional or negligent starvation will not be sufficient to prove that
by accidentally depriving civilians of objects indispensable to survival,
the perpetrator intended to starve civilians. Rather, the prosecutor
must show that the perpetrator acted with intent to attack a civilian
object leading to starvation. The third and fourth elements concern the
chapeau or contextual elements, which must always be present for a
war crime to occur. The only difference between the crime of starvation

112. Assembly of State Parties, supra note 68, at 8. It is important to note
that in accordance with Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute, this
amendment only enters into force for those State Parties that have
accepted the amendment within one year after the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or acceptance of the amendment. However,
given that the amendment was adopted unanimously by the Assembly of
State Parties, it is unlikely that any State Parties will take a reservation
to the amendment, which would lead to fragmentation of the treaty.
113. Id. at 9.
114. GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 5.
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under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) and Article 8(2)(e) is whether the crime took
place during an IAC or NIAC, as revealed in the third element. 115
Since there have been no prosecutions of starvation as a war crime
under ICL, 116 some scholarly interpretation of “intent” is necessary.
Article 30(2) of the Rome Statute establishes that a person has intent
where: “(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the
conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause
that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course
of events.” 117 Starvation is a specific intent crime; in other words, the
prosecutor must show that the perpetrator acted with an intent that
went beyond the mere act of depriving objects indispensable to survival
to include achieving the objective of starvation. 118 Unlike the specific
intent crime of genocide, however, there is likely no need to establish
proof of desire to starve civilians; it is enough to prove that the
perpetrator knew or was aware that the consequence of deprivation of
objects indispensable to survival would lead to the result of
starvation, 119 thus lowering the requisite mens rea from knowledge to
recklessness. 120 While the Rome Statute makes no distinction between
first and second-degree famine crimes, on a conceptual level, they can
be distinguished by the mens rea of knowledge equating to a first-degree
famine crime, while recklessness equates to a second-degree famine
crime. 121
Finally, the Rome Statute only applies to situations and cases over
which the ICC has jurisdiction. 122 Neither Yemen nor the other primary
parties to the armed conflict are parties to the Rome Statute. 123 Thus,
application of the Rome Statute in this case is largely theoretical in
nature. Under the principle of complementarity, domestic jurisdictions
should have similar statutes prohibiting starvation as the one laid forth
here. 124 Also, since prohibition on the use of starvation against civilians
115. INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE SWISS PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE
ROME STATUTE TO INCLUDE THE WAR CRIME OF STARVATION IN NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 5 (2019).
116. GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 1.
117. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 30(2)(a)–(b).
118. GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 9.
119. Id. at 11.
120. See e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 275 (arguing that international criminal
law supports the mens rea of recklessness for second-degree famine
crimes).
121. Id. at 274–75.
122. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 1.
123. Id. at 1.
124. INT’L CRIM. CT., THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE,
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER 3 (2003) (“The principle of complementarity
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as a method of warfare is customary international law, and the Rome
Statute is a codification of custom, the language of Article 8 is useful
even if the belligerents are never charged by the ICC.
2.

Crimes Against Humanity

Article 7 of the Rome Statute enumerates CAH under the
jurisdiction of the ICC. 125 As an alternative to charging perpetrators of
starvation with war crimes under Article 8, prosecutors could bring
related charges of CAH under Article 7(1)(b) extermination or Article
7(1)(k) other inhumane acts. 126 CAH may be committed in peacetime
or during an armed conflict, and unlike the crime of genocide, CAH
need not target a specific group. 127 Moreover, with CAH, there is no
need for prosecutors to prove specific intent; simple intent to commit
any of the listed acts under Article 7 is sufficient to charge perpetrators,
so long as the chapeau elements are also met—i.e. that the attack was
widespread or systematic. 128
Intentional starvation of civilians may be charged as extermination
under the Rome Statute. Extermination includes “the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food
and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population.” 129 The elements of the crime of extermination under
Article 7(1)(b) are:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by
inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the
destruction of part of a population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of, a mass killing
of members of a civilian population.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

governs the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction . . . The Statute recognizes
that States have the first responsibility and right to prosecute
international crimes. The ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where
national legal systems fail to do so, including where they purport to act
but in reality are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out
proceedings.”).
125. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(1).
126. See Diana Kearney, Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity, 46
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 253, 258 (2013).
127. Crimes Against Humanity, U.N. OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION &
RESP. TO PROTECT, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimesagainst-humanity.shtml [perma.cc/FNW2-6C4F].
128. Id.
129. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(2)(b).
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4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population. 130

With respect to the first element, the Rome Statute drafters note
that the infliction of such conditions could include the deprivation of
access to food and medicine. 131 Additionally, the drafters note that
“killed” is interchangeable with “caused death,” 132 either directly or
indirectly. 133 The mens rea for extermination is satisfied by a showing
of intentional killing or that the perpetrator recklessly caused the death
of civilians. 134 With respect to the second element, some interpretation
on mass killing is necessary to determine exactly what number of
civilians must be killed to satisfy this element. The third and fourth
elements are the chapeau elements, which require a showing that the
conduct took place within an armed conflict and the crime was
widespread or systematic. 135 Notably, first-degree famine crimes could
be considered crimes of extermination due to the actus reus and
attendant circumstances of depriving civilians of food or water. 136
Another way to bring charges against perpetrators of starvation
falls under the blanket category of CAH in Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome
Statute:
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane
act.
2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to
in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the character of the act.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

130. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 111, at art. 7(1)(b).
131. Id. at n.9.
132. Id. at art. 7(1)(a) n.7.
133. Id. at art. 7(1)(b) n.8.
134. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 245; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No.
ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment ¶ 93, 94 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter
Bagilishema].
135. See ELEMENTS

OF

CRIMES, supra note 111, at art. 7(1)(b).

136. Marcus, supra note 2, at 273.
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5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population. 137

With respect to the first element, the prosecutor must show that
the perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 138 The ICTY
ruled in the Krnojelac case that imposing a severe shortage of food can
constitute infliction of great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 139 The mens
rea for extermination is satisfied by a showing of intentional killing or
that the perpetrator recklessly caused the death of civilians. 140 The
remaining elements concern the chapeau elements, which require that
the crime be widespread or systematic. 141
To prove starvation, circumstantial evidence may be required to
build an inference of causation between the act (e.g. attacks on water
supplies) and the consequence (e.g. death/injury caused by cholera
outbreak in water supply). 142 Charging perpetrators of starvation crimes
does present “evidentiary challenges to proving the cause of a death in
famine: the causal chain from act to outcome is longer, more
complicated, and much more beset by challenges of demonstrating proof
beyond doubt, than in the case of . . . violent killing.” 143 Indeed,
“defense counsel could argue that a malnourished individual died on
account of an infection not directly associated with forced deprivation,
or because of that person’s failure to obtain alternative sources of
food.” 144 According to some experts, however, causation does not have
to be proven because all that is required to prove starvation crimes is
that the perpetrator intended to deprive civilians of objects
indispensable to survival and knew or should have known that the
consequence (i.e. starvation/injury) would result. 145 Indeed, the
threshold for starvation “implies a high degree of deprivation, more
137. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 111, at art. 7(1)(k).
138. Id.
139. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 179–83
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002).
140. Marcus, supra note 2, at 245; see also Bagilishema, supra note 134, at ¶¶
93–94.
141. See ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 111, at art. 7(1)(k).
142. The International Court of Justice has allowed for the use of
circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available or under the
exclusive control of one of the parties. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 17 (Apr. 9).
143. De Waal, supra note 18, at 189.
144. Id.
145. GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 12–13.
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significant than the ‘not adequately provided’ standard that brings into
play the rules of IHL regulating humanitarian relief operations. . . .
However, it is not necessary for deaths to occur.” 146 Prosecutors would
therefore focus on proving the attack on a civilian object occurred
rather than the result of starvation, making reasonable inferences
concerning starvation to prove responsibility for starvation crimes.
3. Modes of Liability

Assigning responsibility to individual actors for starvation crimes
requires a determination of what role the individual played in
committing the crime. 147 The modes of liability for starvation crimes
may come in three forms: individual criminal responsibility, command
responsibility, or State responsibility. 148
Individual criminal responsibility arises when an individual
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime. 149 Forms of
individual criminal responsibility include: planning; instigating;
ordering; committing (direct perpetration); aiding and abetting in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime; joint criminal enterprise;
co-perpetration (joint perpetration); indirect perpetration; and indirect
co-perpetration. 150
Command responsibility “assigns criminal responsibility to highranking members of military as well as militia for the crimes committed
by their subordinates.” 151 It requires that the charged individual holds
a “superior subordinate relationship with the direct perpetrators and
that they knew or should have known that the crimes were being or
had been committed.” 152 Command responsibility is outlined in Article
28 of the Rome Statute. 153 Theoretically, if a subordinate commits a
first-degree famine crime by attacking an object indispensable for
survival and the commanding officer knew or should have known that
starvation of civilians was likely and recklessly disregarded that risk,
146. Gillard, supra note 3, at 10.
147. See GLOB. RTS. COMPLIANCE, supra note 50, at 16.
148. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 25, 28; see also United
Nations Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
23 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No.10, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA].
149. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 25(3); see also INT’L CRIM. L. SERV.,
MODES OF LIABILITY: COMMISSION AND PARTICIPATION, 3–4 (2018).
150. Id.
151. CASE MATRIX NETWORK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES:
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2016).
152. Id.
153. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 28.
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then the subordinate would be individually criminally liable in the firstdegree, while the commanding officer would be criminally liable in the
second-degree. 154 If, however, the commanding officer ordered the
attack, both the commander and subordinate would be liable for firstdegree famine crimes. 155
Finally, a third mode of liability is State responsibility. The law of
State responsibility prohibits States from committing internationally
wrongful acts. 156 Violations of the principles of IHL, such as distinction,
proportionality, superfluous injury, and humanity, are serious breaches
of States’ international obligations constituting internationally
wrongful acts. 157 States that commit internationally wrongful acts may
be subject to suit for violations of customary international law relating
to international humanitarian or criminal law before the ICJ. 158 If a
State is found to have committed an internationally wrongful act, it is
required to cease the violation, make assurances of non-repetition, and
make reparations for injuries, where appropriate. 159

III. EVIDENCE OF STARVATION CRIMES IN YEMEN
As noted above, starvation deaths in Yemen have been caused
primarily by three factors: (1) economic crisis caused by the dismantling
of the Yemen Banking System, (2) military attacks on agricultural and
food production that destroy, deny or render useless objects
indispensable to survival, and (3) blockades of airports and seaports
causing obstruction of humanitarian aid. 160 With respect to the
economic crisis, although it has significantly contributed to food
insecurity in Yemen, and some legal scholars have argued that it could
be used as evidence in prosecuting starvation, 161 the likelihood of
prosecutions based on that factor alone is tenuous, 162 and thus, the
analysis presented here focuses on attacks on objects indispensable to
154. Marcus, supra note 2, at 278.
155. Id.
156. See ARSIWA, supra note 148, at art. 2.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at art. 30; Wall AO, supra note 34, at ¶ 151.
160. See MUNDY, supra note 28. Bosnian Genocide case at the ICJ which was
ongoing at the time of the criminal trials at the ICTY. See generally
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J.
595 (July 11).
161. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 11.
162. See e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 279 (arguing that “[e]conomic policies
that lead to mass starvation are [not] ipso facto criminal . . . International
law does not criminalize any form of economic organization.”).
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survival and blockades, as these events are most likely to lead to
successful prosecutions of starvation crimes in Yemen.
A.

Attacks on of Objects Indispensable to Survival

One of the main contributors to starvation and related diseases in
Yemen has been the deliberate and disproportionate destruction of
objects indispensable to survival. 163 According to the commentaries to
the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol II: “‘Objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population’ means objects which are of
basic importance for the population from the point of view of providing
the means of existence.” 164 Evidence of destruction of objects
indispensable to survival in Yemen has been well documented by groups
such as the World Peace Foundation, 165 the Human Rights Council’s
Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, 166 Global Legal Action
Network, 167 Yemen Data Project, 168 and Yemen’s Ministry of
Agriculture and Irrigation. 169 Destruction of objects indispensable to
survival include attacks on critical infrastructure, such as electricity
sources, water supplies, irrigation dams, agricultural extension facilities,
and health facilities. 170 Indeed, the U.N. Human Rights Council
reported that Saudi airstrikes have caused significant damage to civilian
objects leading to numerous civilian deaths. 171 This section examines
the destruction of objects indispensable to survival in Ta’izz, Tihama,
163. GLOBAL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE & WORLD PEACE FOUND.,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MASS STARVATION: STARVATION IN YEMEN 1–2
(2019) [hereinafter WPF Policy Brief].
164. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 100, at art. 14.
165. See generally WPF Policy Brief, supra note 163.
166. See Yemen: Collective Failure, Collective Responsibility – U.N. Expert
Report, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 3,
2019), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx
?NewsID=24937&LangID=E [perma.cc/C7FR-4544]; see
generally Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen,
Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/45/6 (Sept. 14, 2020).
167. See generally Yemen: A Humanitarian Crisis, GLOB. LEGAL ACTION
NETWORK, https://www.glanlaw.org/yemen [perma.cc/X7SE-LG7C].
168. See generally Yemen Data Project, YEMEN DATA
PROJECT (2020), https://yemendataproject.org/index.html [perma.cc/B
5CE-U6T4].
169. See generally Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation, MINISTRY OF AGRIC.
& IRRIGATION (Sept. 16, 2020),
http://www.agricultureyemen.com/index.php [perma.cc/7RTE-RBDM].
170. WPF Policy Brief, supra note 163, at 1–2.
171. United Nations Experts Point to Possible War Crimes by Parties to the
Conflict, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=23479 [perma.cc/2BEY-XQ4E].
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and the Red Sea Coast as some of the most egregious incidents of the
war in Yemen causing starvation of civilians.
1. Ta’izz

As a consequence of being one of the primary battlegrounds of the
conflict between Houthi rebels and the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition,
Ta’izz governorate suffered some of the worst death tolls of the war.
Beginning in 2014, civilian objects were repeatedly targeted, leading to
the deaths and displacement of many civilians. 172 Unlawful armed
attacks were committed by Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia-led Coalition,
Emirati forces, and Yemeni military forces. 173 A variety of factors have
worsened food insecurity in Ta’izz leading to starvation of civilians. As
a result of ongoing fighting, access to food in markets has been reduced
significantly, and the price of food items has increased drastically,
making food unaffordable for many. 174 Additionally, Saudi Arabia-led
Coalition 175As an example, in December 2017, Saudi Arabia-led
Coalition airstrikes targeted a market in al-Ta’iziyah district,
completely destroying the market and leaving 54 civilians dead and a
further 32 injured . 176 Seventy-five percent of the civilian population in
Ta’izz in August 2018 were ranked as food insecure and at least 85%
were dependent on humanitarian aid. 177
2. Tihama

In addition to the attacks in Ta’izz, other areas of the country,
including fishing villages have been targeted. 178 The period of March
2015 to August 2016 saw many airstrikes on agricultural targets.179
Attacks on agricultural land are particularly egregious because only 5%
of Yemen’s land is arable, and prior to the war, only 3% of Yemen’s
total land surface was used for agriculture. 180 In Tihama, the attacks
on objects indispensable to survival were not on fields or flocks, but on
irrigation systems powered by oil-driven pumping. 181 Beginning in 2011,
172. WPF Policy Brief, supra note 163, at 6–7.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 7.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 9.
179. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 11.
180. Id. at 12.
181. Frank van Steenbergen, Yemen’s Irrigation System: Invisible Victim of
the
War,
DOWN
TO
EARTH
(May
3,
2017),
https://www.downtoearth.org.in/blog/yemen-s-irrigationsysteminvisible-victim-of-the-war-57759 [perma.cc/FS5Y-VYDJ].
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and as a consequence of the war, oil shortages and price increases have
made it near impossible for farmers to irrigate their land. 182
Since the late 1970s, the World Bank has invested in professionally
engineered water diversion structures, overseen by the Tihama
Development Authority (TDA), used to strengthen water disbursement
to farmlands in the region. 183 Twice in August 2015 and again in
September, the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition delivered a total of 15
airstrikes on the TDA’s central compound just outside Hudaydah, and
a further three airstrikes attacked irrigation structures in wadi Siham
in October 2015. 184 The Yemen Data Project reports two additional
attacks on TDA infrastructure in 2016 and another three in early
2017. 185 As a consequence of these attacks, agricultural yields decreased
by 24% among farmers in wadi Zabid and 46% in wadi Siham, due
primarily to irrigation water shortages. 186 The Tihama region, once
considered the breadbasket of Yemen, has decreased land cultivation
by 51%, crop yields declined by 20–61% per hectare, there has been a
complete annihilation of fruits, vegetables, and livestock population, as
well as a population where 43% are food insecure. 187
3. The Red Sea Coast

Artisanal fishing has long been a primary source of food production
in Yemen. 188 The General Authority of Fishing in the Red Sea has
documented damages to fishing from the beginning of the war through
December 2017. 189 The report shows that 146 fishermen have died190
and 220 fishing boats were destroyed due to Saudi Arabia-led Coalition
airstrikes. 191 Prior to the war in 2015, Yemen’s fisheries sector ranked
second in terms of exports and constituted 2% of Yemen’s GDP. 192

182. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 13.
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Yemen’s Burnt Granary, FLOOD-BASED LIVELIHOODS NETWORK
FOUND., http://spate-irrigation.org/yemens-burnt-granary/#more-6422
[perma.cc/HJH6-55D2].
188. WPF Policy Brief, supra note 163, at 3.
189. AMMAR MOHAMMED AL-FAREH, THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN YEMEN
ON ARTISANAL FISHING OF THE RED SEA 21 (2018); MUNDY, supra note
28, at 16.
190. Id.
191. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 16.
192. AL-FAREH, supra note 189, at 7.
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B.

Blockades

Another cause of starvation in Yemen is the unlawful obstruction
and manipulation of humanitarian relief through blockades. Evidence
of impeding humanitarian supplies and operations has been
documented by the aforementioned groups. 193 The evidence shows that
blockades have halted delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as
causing unreasonable delays in the transport of humanitarian aid to
areas affected by the famine. 194 This section examines the blockade of
Hudaydah, one of the most egregious incidents of the war in Yemen
because of its effect on the worsening of starvation of civilians.
1. Hudaydah

Hudaydah was Yemen’s poorest governate prior to the outbreak of
war in 2015. 195 Sixty percent of Yemen’s malnourished population
resided in Hudaydah. 196 There are three major ports in the governorate,
two of which (Al-Hudaydah and Al-Saleef) receive the majority of
Yemen’s food imports; the total number of commercial imports has
declined significantly since 2014. 197 There are two other ports in Yemen
at Aden and Al-Mukalla, but they lack the infrastructure necessary to
receive bulk food shipments. 198 In April 2015, the Saudi Arabia-led
Coalition undertook a blockade of the Red Sea ports in order to inspect
commercial ships that could be carrying prohibited weapons to the
Houthis. 199 The consequence of the blockade, however, which lasted 16
months, was to effectively limit the flow of food, fuel and medicine to
civilians. 200 On 6 November 2017, the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition
retaliated against the Houthi missile attack on Riyadh by imposing a
sixteen-day total air, sea, and land blockade of Yemen, which blocked
all food and fuel coming into the country.201

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
While there is ample evidence to show that the civilian population
in Yemen is suffering from starvation and related diseases, prosecutors
must determine what charges are appropriate and States must
determine whether any of the parties to the armed conflict have
193. WPF Policy Brief, supra note 163, at 6.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 7.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 7–8.
200. Id. at 8.
201. Id.
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breached an international obligation that could be adjudicated by the
ICJ.
To amount to a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute,
perpetrators must intentionally use starvation as a method of warfare
by depriving objects indispensable to survival. 202 The language of the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions is broader, stating
that it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects
indispensable to survival. 203
Deliberate destruction of objects indispensable to survival, such as
farms and fishing villages, is a violation of IHL under API of the Geneva
Conventions and Article 8 of the Rome Statute. 204 Yemen and Saudi
Arabia are signatories to the 1977 Protocol I, but not to the Rome
Statute. 205 The attacks on agricultural sites and equipment in Tihama,
the destruction of fishing boats and skilled fishermen along the Red Sea
coastline, and destruction of the food markets in Ta’izz demonstrate
the deliberate efforts of belligerents to starve the population into
submission. 206 Indeed, as a number of sources have reported, a senior
Saudi diplomat stated off-record, “[o]nce we control them, we will feed
them.” 207 This is probably the strongest proof of intent regarding the
Saudi Arabia-led Coalition’s actions that could lead to charges of war
crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv), Article 8(2)(e), or complementary
domestic statutes.
A key question that will need to be analyzed by prosecutors is
whether the perpetrators of starvation knew or should have known that
the sites that they were attacking were civilian targets, as well as
whether they knew or should have known that the consequence of
attacking those targets would lead to destruction of objects
indispensable to survival and starvation of civilians. To this end, it is
unlikely that American and British military advisors who gave target
intelligence to the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition in Tihama did not know
the location and/or purpose of the TDA in providing critical irrigation
infrastructure to farms in the region. 208 Likewise, the perpetrators of
attacks on the food markets and fishing villages should have known
202. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
203. Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at 54(1); Additional Protocol II,
supra note 66, at art. 14.
204. Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 54(2); Rome Statute, supra
note 5, at art. 8(2)(b)(xxv).
205. Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at 397, 428; Rome Statute, supra
note 5.
206. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 13, 16; WPF Policy Brief, supra note 163, at
6–7.
207. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 7. See generally Bin Salman Threatens, supra
note 33.
208. MUNDY, supra note 28, at 15.
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that by targeting these sites, the civilian population would likely starve.
Thus, determining which actors and/or States are responsible for
starvation crimes is a key consideration for future investigations.
A significant challenge in this analysis is determining whether the
starvation of civilians would have occurred but-for the attacks on
objects indispensable to survival. In other words, given that Yemen was
already on the brink of famine prior to the start of the war, are
perpetrators of these attacks still culpable for causing civilian
casualties? Moreover, are the deaths caused by diseases such as cholera
and malnutrition too attenuated to be linked to attacks on objects
indispensable to survival? How do we map the chain of causation and
what if there is a break in the link of causation when multiple actors
have targeted the same sites? All of these questions need to be
addressed before charges can be brought against perpetrators of
starvation. But given that the crime of starvation hinges upon the
intent of the perpetrator to attack objects indispensable to survival or
starve civilians, and not on the outcome, successful prosecutions need
to focus on evidence of intent, such as the statement made by the Saudi
diplomat, to build their case.
Additionally, while the blockade of Hudaydah was deployed for a
legitimate military purpose—to stop the flow of prohibited weapons to
the Houthis under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 209—the
blocking of essential items needed by the civilian population may
constitute a war crime because under IHL, blockades must allow for
humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population. 210 Inferring criminal
intent in blockades is particularly challenging when a legitimate
military purpose is claimed. But just because a legitimate military aim
is articulated does not mean the blockade complies with the principles
of IHL, which include distinction, 211 proportionality, 212 precaution of

209. See generally S.C. Res. 2216 (Apr. 14, 2015).
210. Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 70(2); see also Yemen: US
to Stop Aid in Houthi Areas if Rebels do not Cooperate, AL JAZEERA
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/yemen-stopaid-houthi-areas-rebels-cooperate200225071207332.html#:~:text=Yemen’s%20Houthi%20rebels%2C%20w
ho%20control,control%20over%20the%20humanitarian%20campaign
[https://perma.cc/P5VZ-D58K].
211. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 57(1); Additional
Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 13(1)-(2); See also Nuclear Weapons
AO, supra note 72, at ¶ 78 (declaring the principle of distinction is one
of the “cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric
of humanitarian law.”).
212. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 51(5)(b), art.
85(3)(b); Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at, art. 3(2); 1996
Additional Protocol II, supra note 66, at art. 3(8)(c).
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attacks, 213 necessity, 214 prohibition on unnecessary suffering/superfluous
injury, 215 and humanity. 216 If the blockade failed any of these principles,
a violation of IHL would constitute either a war crime, crime against
humanity, or a breach of an international obligation (for States).
Prosecutors must look to the overall lawfulness of the blockade to
determine whether there was an intent to starve the population, and if
so, whether and when it developed during the course of the blockade.
Such evidence might include whether those in control of the blockade
made good faith efforts to allow humanitarian aid to be delivered to
civilians in a timely manner, or whether commanding officers
consciously disregarded the risk of starvation to civilians.
If prosecutors are unable to prove the requisite criminal intent to
charge perpetrators with a war crime for starving civilians through
attacks on objects indispensable to survival or blockades, they may
bring charges of CAH under Article 7(1)(b) extermination or Article
7(1)(k) other inhumane acts. These provisions allow charges against
perpetrators for killing or inflicting great suffering or serious bodily
injury to civilians without the need to prove that the perpetrator
intended the consequence to occur. 217 The only requirements beyond
the chapeau elements are that the perpetrator committed the act
(destruction of objects indispensable to survival /blockade) and the
consequence (starvation) occurred because of that act. 218 Thus, bringing
charges under Article 7 of the Rome Statute may offer a better solution
to prosecuting perpetrators of starvation.
Finally, Yemen is not State Party to the Rome Statute, 219 and the
starvation crimes that have occurred in Yemen have not been
committed by State Parties to the Rome Statute—with perhaps the
exception of the United Kingdom in providing target intelligence to the
213. Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 57(1) (“In the conduct of
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects.”); Additional Protocol II, supra
note 66, at art. 13(1) (“The civilian population and individual civilians
shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations.”).
214. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 90; Wall AO, supra
note 34, at ¶ 140.
215. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 35(2); Rome
Statute, supra note 5, at art. 8(2)(b)(xx); Nuclear Weapons AO, supra
note 72, at ¶ 78.
216. Fundamental Principles of IHL, supra note 77.
217. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(1)(b), art. 7(1)(k).
218. Id.
219. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties
%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KBU8PUGX].
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Saudi Arabia-led Coalition. 220 Thus, the ICC would only have
jurisdiction over starvation crimes in Yemen if the U.N. Security
Council referred the situation to the ICC under the principle of
universal jurisdiction. 221 This is not impossible, as it is how the
situations in Darfur and Libya were referred to the ICC. 222 However,
the current political climate of the U.N. Security Council, combined
with the fact that several of the members of the U.N. Security Council
have assisted the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition airstrikes in Yemen
through arms sales, 223 a referral to the ICC seems unlikely any time in
the near future. Yet, because starvation is prohibited under customary
international law and IHL, 224 there are other courts that may bring
charges against responsible parties.
If not the ICC, then the U.N. Security Council could, as it did with
the ICTY and ICTR, 225 establish a U.N. sanctioned tribunal with its
own statute and mandate to try perpetrators of war crimes and CAH
in Yemen’s Civil War. Such a mandate could be limited to the crime
of starvation in order to garner the greatest level of political support
among members of the U.N. Security Council. Hybrid courts, such as
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, which were authorized by U.N. General
Assembly resolutions, offer another means of accountability that
balance international and domestic criminal law. 226 States with statutes
that allow for universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity or
war crimes, such as Germany, France, or Spain, could invoke universal
jurisdiction over individual perpetrators that travel to those states.227
Universal jurisdiction has been invoked by the Special Court for Sierra
Leone in bringing former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, to justice

220. See MUNDY, supra note 28, at 15.
221. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icccpi.int/about/how-the-court-works [https://perma.cc/D37Z-9X5V].
222. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icccpi.int/darfur [https://perma.cc/WEA4-YHKJ]; Situation in Libya,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur; ICC, Situation in
Libya, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya [https://perma.cc/B6LM-HHZ8].
223. YEMEN ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, AIDING AND ABETTING: HOLDING
STATES, CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR WAR
CRIMES IN YEMEN 29, 33, 35-36 (Sept. 2020).
224. Additional Protocol I, supra note 65, at art. 54(1).
225. See generally S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
226. See generally G.A. Res. 57/228 (Feb. 27, 2003); G.A. Res. 135 (Aug. 14,
2000).
227. Angela Mudukuti, Universal Jurisdiction — Opportunities and Hurdles,
OPINIOJURIS, (Sept. 4, 2019)
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/09/universal-jurisdiction-opportunitiesand-hurdles/ [https://perma.cc/8MBU-UHUJ].
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for war crimes and CAH. 228 It is also how the U.S. invoked its
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the torture statute to try and convict
Taylor’s son, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Jr. for torture crimes. 229
Finally, another avenue for accountability may be found at the ICJ.
States that have committed a breach of an international obligation may
be responsible for internationally wrongful acts. For example, breaches
of a human rights treaty may allow the ICJ to exercise its jurisdiction
over States that have committed internationally wrongful acts, or for
violations of IHL committed by individuals and/or commanders that
can be attributed to the State.

Conclusion
Accountability for starvation crimes committed in Yemen is
possible and should be pursued by the international community. Two
pathways to accountability are strongly urged.
First, supporters of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2417, which
condemns starvation crimes in Yemen and calls for accountability,
should place diplomatic pressure on the U.N. Security Council to
authorize an ad-hoc tribunal with a mandate to prosecute individuals
responsible for destruction of objects indispensable to survival and
starvation crimes in Yemen. The political climate of the U.N. Security
Council is undoubtedly grim at the moment, but the makeup of the
U.N. Security Council is ever changing with non-permanent members
rotating every two years, 230 and the upcoming U.S. Presidential election
in 2020 could bring new leadership to the White House and perhaps a
more optimistic attitude toward international law and diplomacy.
There are also reports that the war in Yemen is winding down, 231 due
in part to the U.N. brokered Riyadh Agreement, 232 which could help
stabilize the region and pave the path for accountability mechanisms.
228. BANKOLE THOMPSON, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction: Law and Practice
in Sierra Leone, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE SIERRA LEONE
PROFILE, 81–84 (2015).
229. Laura Richardson Brownlee, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United
States: American Attitudes and Practices in the Prosecution of Charles
“Chuckie” Taylor Jr., 9 WASH. UNIV. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 331, 336
(2010).
NATIONS
SEC.
COUNCIL
230. Current
Members,
UNITED
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members
[https://perma.cc/QBD4-64EW].
231. See Ali Younes, Yemen’s War: Sings Conflict Could Wind Down in
2020: UN, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/yemen-war-signs-conflictwind-2020-191215185510885.html [https://perma.cc/FA8F-Q9KB].
232. Peace Deal Announced Between Yemeni Government, Separatists, AL
JAZEERA (Nov. 5. 2019),
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To that end, stakeholders, such as the U.N. Human Rights
Council’s Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen, international NGOs,
and members of the U.N. General Assembly should push for a resolution
to create an ad-hoc court to charge individuals with war crimes and
CAH for the use of starvation as a method of warfare in Yemen’s Civil
War. In doing so, the statute of the envisaged tribunal should adopt
the language of Articles 8(2)(b)(xxv), 8(2)(e), 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(k) of
the Rome Statute to allow prosecutors to cast a broad net in charging
perpetrators of starvation crimes. The tribunal should be authorized
with broad investigative powers and the ability to issue arrest warrants
and call upon the international community to turn over perpetrators to
the court for swift administration of justice. Given that perpetrators
who planned starvation crimes in Yemen are likely to try to shield
themselves from justice through diplomatic immunity, the statute of
the tribunal should not allow for Head of State immunity, in accordance
with Rome Statute Article 27, which provides that the statute, “shall
apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. 233 In particular, official capacity as Head of State or
Government, a member of Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person
from criminal responsibility under this Statute. . . .” 234 Additionally,
prosecutors should be empowered to charge any individual, regardless
of diplomatic status or nationality, with war crimes or CAH for their
role in using starvation as a method of warfare in Yemen.
The second pathway to accountability is through the ICJ. This
should be seen as a pathway in addition to prosecuting individuals
rather than an alternative to criminal responsibility. Notably, the ICJ
does not prosecute individuals. 235 Instead, it adjudicates disputes
between States and renders judgments concerning violations of
international law insofar as States have breached their international
obligations, such as those arising under the Genocide Convention or
other treaty obligations. 236 A breach of an international obligation by a
State constitutes an internationally wrongful act, which the ICJ can
order the State to cease, make assurances of non-repetition, and order
a range of remedies from specific performance to compensatory

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/peace-deal-announcedyemeni-government-separatists-191105145143441.html
[https://perma.cc/473J-SNWH].
233. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27.
234. Id. at art. 27(1).
235. Frequently Asked Questions, Int’l Ct. Just., https://www.icjcij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/K9YW-C7LY].
236. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(2)(a) Oct. 24, 1945,
U.S.T. 993, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter Statute of the I.C.J].
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damages, depending on the harm suffered. 237 A State may bring a claim
against another State at the ICJ for adjudication of violations of an
erga omnes nature, 238 as was recently done by The Gambia against
Myanmar for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. 239 In the
context of Yemen’s Civil War, this could be done either by invoking
the jurisdiction of the Court through Compromis (Special Agreement)
or through the Court’s contentious jurisdiction for violations of IHL.
This could be done by any State against Saudi Arabia, Iran, or any of
the other States that may have committed violations of IHL, potentially
including the States that have aided and abetted by provision of arms
if those weapons were used to target objects indispensable to survival
or to starve the civilian population. 240
A case brought through Compromis requires that both parties
consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. 241 This generally comes about
when both parties have justiciable disputes against each other that the
Court is best suited to adjudicate. 242 The likelihood of Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, or Iran submitting an application to the Court by Compromis
seems unrealistic. The alternative is to invoke the contentious
jurisdiction of the Court through some treaty violation.
Neither Yemen, Saudi Arabia, nor Iran have accepted the Court’s
compulsory jurisdiction through unilateral declaration to Article 36(2)
of the Statute of the Court. 243 Therefore, in order to invoke the ICJ’s
contentious jurisdiction, a treaty conferring jurisdiction to the ICJ must
exist and be related to the breaches alleged by the State seeking to have
the Court adjudicate the matter. 244 There are presently two treaties
237. ARSIWA, supra note 148, at arts. 2, 30–31, 34–36; Wall AO, supra note
34, at ¶ 151.
238. Ardit Memeti & Bekim Nuhija, The Concept of Erga Omnes Obligations
in International Law, 14 NEW BALKAN POL., 1 (2013); see also Statute
of the I.C.J., supra note 236, at art. 36(2)(c).
239. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Provisional Measures, 2020, I.C.J.
¶¶ 1–2 (Jan. 23).
240. See YEMEN ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, supra note 223, at 52
(discussing State responsibility for aiding and abetting violations of IHL,
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Yemen).
241. Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 236, at art. 40(1).
242. See PEMMARAJU S. RAO, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: GENERAL TOPICS, 11–
17 (2003).
243. A complete list of States that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ through Article 36(2) declarations can be found on the Court’s
website. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as
Compulsory, INT’L CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations
(last visited Oct. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5ECA-37Y7].
244. This is because none of the States involved in this armed conflict have
made declarations of accession to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. See
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with compromissory clauses conferring compulsory jurisdiction to the
ICJ to which Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are all party: the Torture
Convention and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. 245 Theoretically, Yemen could bring a claim against
Saudi Arabia, Iran, or both States, for violations under one of these
treaties, invoking the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. For
example, Yemen could claim that Saudi Arabia breached its obligations
under the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination Article 5(b) “the right to security of person . . . against
violence or bodily harm . . . .” or Article 5(d)(iv) “the right to public
health, medical care . . . .” 246 Alternatively, Yemen could claim under
the Torture Convention that starvation of the civilian population,
caused by Saudi Arabia or Iran’s breaches in international obligations
constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 16 of
that treaty. 247 It is important to note, however, that to use either of
these treaties as the basis for jurisdiction at the ICJ, Yemen would need
to prove exhaustion of remedies or inability of a State to prosecute
individuals for violations of the treaties. 248
Assuming that one of these treaties may be invoked to bring a claim
before the ICJ, then the ICJ would provide an additional mechanism
for accountability for starvation crimes committed in Yemen. As such,
a decision by the ICJ could lend support for, or provide additional
evidence to an ad-hoc tribunal established to try individuals for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 249
id. But a local treaty, such as the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
treaty between the U.S. and Nicaragua, could confer jurisdiction to the
Court over a related dispute, as the Court determined in the Paramilitary
Activities case. See Paramilitary Activities, supra note 85, at ¶ 176.
245. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 30, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1987)
[hereinafter, Torture Convention]; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 22, Dec. 21, 1965,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969) [hereinafter, Racial Discrimination Convention].
A complete list of treaties conferring compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ
through compromissory clauses is available on the Court’s website. See
Treaties, INT’L CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/treaties
[https://perma.cc/6VAY-8DLS].
246. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 245, at art. 5(b) and
5(d)(iv).
247. Torture Convention, supra note 245, at art. 16.
248. INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE RESOURCE CENTER, EXHAUSTION
DOMESTIC REMEDIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 1 (2017).
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249. Such was the outcome of the Bosnian Genocide case at the ICJ which was
ongoing at the time of the criminal trials at the ICTY. See generally
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J.
595 (July 11).
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Together, these pathways ensure that individuals and States
responsible for starvation in Yemen will be held accountable for their
crimes and violations of international law. If the international
community fails to act in holding perpetrators of starvation to account,
not only will innocent Yemenis never see justice for the harm they have
endured, but the world will have acquiesced to these crimes in its silence
and emboldened the perpetrators to continue to use starvation as a
method of warfare. The international community must act to bring
accountability to the perpetrators of these crimes and justice to their
victims. These pathways provide the best means to achieve those goals.
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